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EU-Griff nach dem Kaukasus

Das Centre for European Studies (Brüssel) CEPS, eine eher unscheinbare aber nichtsdestotrotz bedeutende Denkfabrik im Umfeld von EU und OECD-Institutionen, entwirft unter dem Deckmäntelchen der Friedenssicherung weitreichende Pläne zur Integration der Kaukasus-Staaten unter das EU-Regime. Das Papier steckt bereits die nächsten Claims zur Erweiterung der EU-Einflußgebiete ab. Umstandslos knüpft das Papier damit an die Großraumpläne des NS an. Insofern handelt es sich dabei um nichts weniger als einen weiteren Schritt zur Zurückdrängung der Nachkriegsordnung. Das Papier bezieht sich insbesondere auf die Energiereserven der Region. Konsequenterweise wird sorgsam ausgelotet, wie Rußland zu solch einem Zugriff steht.

Working Document No. 145, May 2000

a new deal for the whole region, incorporating:

a South Caucasus Community,

Russian/EU/US Southern Dimension cooperation,

enhanced Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation

Sergiu Celac and Michael Emerson (Chairmen)
Nathalie Tocci (rapporteur), Terry Adams, Bruno Coppieters,
Alexander Liono, Jean Radvanyi, Marius Vahl, Thomas Waelde, Nicholas Whyte

ISBN 92-9079-294-9

© Copyright 2000, Centre for European Policy Studies.

Contents

Abstract

Preface

Executive summary

Appeals of the leaders of the region
EU-Russia-US to respond
A Stability Pact for the Caucasus

4.1 South Caucasus conflict resolution and prevention
4.2 South Caucasus regional integration
4.3 South Caucasus regional security system

Inset A: Tool-kit for the competences of autonomous entities
Inset B: Tool-kit for regional trading arrangements
Inset C: Tool-kit for regional integration
Inset D: Tool-kit for security mechanisms

5.1 Russia/EU/US Southern Dimension cooperation
5.2 Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation
5.3 Oil and gas development

Annexes

Annex A: Background on the economies of the Caucasus
Annex B: Background on areas of conflict or tension
Annex C: South Caspian oil ­ realities and issues
Annex D: Turkey, Europe and Caspian gas
Annex E: Joint Russian-Georgian agreement on military bases, November 1999
Annex F: Territorial ceilings for armaments under the CFE Treaty
Annex G: Proposals of Georgia for Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Annex H: UK-Irish agreement on Northern Ireland, 1998
Annex I: Kosovo: costs of reconstruction and recovery
Annex J: Bosnia and Herzegovina ­ post-war reconstruction costs
Annex k: Members of the CEPS Task Force for the Caucasus

Maps

Map 1: Political frontiers of the Caucasus
Map 2: Oil/gas pipeline routes

Preface

CEPS formed a Task Force for the Caucasus on 28 January 2000 in concluding a conference in Brussels, convened by CEPS at the proposal of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel. With the present document the Task Force puts into circulation the preliminary text of a comprehensive plan for the region. Consultations are now being undertaken with interested parties, official and non-governmental, in the region and outside, in order to improve the present proposals operationally, and to create momentum in public debate.

A word on the title "A Stability Pact for the Caucasus" is called for. The Task Force has hesitated over this. Of course the substance rather than the name is the main point. But still the chosen title serves to bring into the open some vital issues. Is the intention to copy the Balkan Stability Pact of 1999, or the Balladur Stability Pact of 1995? Neither, since the circumstances in each case are different and so must also be the mechanisms. This is in spite of some obvious similarities between the Balkans and Caucasus (multi-ethnic "Balkanisation", conflicts, frontiers of former empires and ancient civilisations).

Still there are three features in common: 1/ multilateral diplomatic initiatives concerning territories that border or overlap the former Soviet Union and the enlarging European Union; 2/ normative foundations consisting of common values codified by the pan- European organisations (Council of Europe and OSCE); 3/ complex actions which have to be based on the interests of regional actors, but also depend on the economic incentives and peace-keeping capacities which only the major powers can deploy.

The proposed Stability Pact for the Caucasus is perhaps closer to the Balkan Stability Pact, being about ethnic conflict resolution or post-conflict situations, rather than preventive diplomacy as with the Balladur Stability Pact. However it is categorically different, in that there has been no significant Western military involvement, the region is entirely post-Soviet Union space, and the proximity of the European Union is less. Still, the Task Force has attempted to put together a draft Stability Pact for the Caucasus with the same three common features identified above. But the cocktail of measures has to be different: more importance for regional integration (of the South Caucasus), direct Russian responsibilities (Northern Caucasus), long-term perspectives of integration with the EU (for the Southern Caucasus), essential need for a Pact to establish a predominantly cooperative regime for the whole region; this would be a regime underwritten by all the regional actors and the major external powers, progressively overtaking the regime of local hostilities backed by opposing geo-political alliances.

There may be some Stability Pact fatigue in the European diplomatic circles. However the following perspective is suggested. An historic task for the post-communist period is to stabilise the borderlands of Russia and the enlarging European Union. The first Stability Pact was rather successful in central Europe. The second Stability Pact is work-in-progress in the Balkans. A third is now needed for the Caucasus, and with that the ultimate prize of achieving stability in the entire European space would have a real chance.

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